Aesthetics developed its modern iterations with the rejection of objectivist analyses of beauty and the adoption of empiricist theories of properties—according to which value-terms such as "beauty" refer to an "idea" constituted by the pleasure of the percipient, rather than to an external, objective quality.
So too do gastronomers extol well-prepared foods for the refined pleasures they afford and the delicacy of palate they demand. Yet even as gastronomers advance their case for both the aesthetic and artistic standing of cuisine, philosophers continue to exclude taste from the aesthetic senses and cuisine from the arts.
This essay explores the persistent division between the two sorts of taste and the pleasures they afford.
There are actually three topics mingled here: the nature of the sense of taste and its alleged limits; the status of taste enjoyment to qualify as aesthetic pleasure; and the claims of cuisine to be considered an art form. I shall focus only on the first two. Let me review very briefly some familiar territory about the appropriation of taste as the governing metaphor—even model—for aesthetic discrimination. There is some inevitable shift of terminology in part of this discussion, for "taste" is the label for a set of receptors of the tongue and mouth, and as such it can be distinguished from smell and touch.
But outside the laboratory taste almost never functions alone, and gastronomers usually use "taste" to refer to the multi-sensory experience of the flavor and texture of food and drink. I trust that context will make clear which meanings are intended. Taste narrow sense and its cousin smell have always ranked low in the hierarchy of the senses established since classical antiquity.
This assessment involves a set of charges that one finds in the philosophical literature from Plato to the present, and that may be found in scientific studies as well. Taste is often considered a rather simple sense that performs only a basic function: to determine whether or not a substance is safe for ingestion; otherwise, it is not terribly significant Gleitman Because of their crucial role in protecting the organism, both of the chemical senses are designated as relatively "primitive" sense modalities McLaughlin and Margolskee With these perspectives, scientific approaches underwrite traditional assumptions about the built-in limits of the sense of taste.
Philosophically, taste is viewed as an impoverished sense on epistemic, moral, and aesthetic grounds. Taste does not furnish significant information about the external world; it delivers only bodily pleasures; and hence it offers temptations that without strict control can lead to gluttony and intemperance. The sense modality with which taste contrasts most dramatically is vision, which along with hearing cooperates with reason to develop knowledge of the world.
Though touch is granted some cognitive standing coordinate with vision, smell and taste compete for last place in a hierarchical ordering that puts the distance or "intellectual" senses of sight and hearing above the proximal or "bodily" senses of touch, smell, and taste. In modern times, the distinction between "aesthetic" and "nonaesthetic" senses supplements this rank ordering. The kind of pleasure furnished by taste demonstrates both its moral danger and its aesthetic limits. In contrast, the distance senses provide perceptions , which have no phenomenal "feel" but in their typical exercise are wholly directed outward towards their objects.
There are exceptions; extreme stimuli such as high volume or piercing light cause physical discomfort. Enjoyment from the bodily senses is correspondingly physical and sensuous, and paradigmatic examples of those pleasures invariably refer to eating and to sex.
Because the pleasures of vision and hearing normally do not arouse bodily sensations, they do not invite the kind of self-indulgence in pleasure that taste does. Aristotle is one of many who warned that the bodily senses provide appetitive pleasures that are pursued by brutes as well as humans, and he advised careful moderation in their exercise.
That sensory pleasures require control is a common observation, of course, and one duly recognized by gastronomers. But moderation addresses only excesses of bodily pleasure; it does not provide a rebuttal to the charge that the pleasure to be had from eating or drinking is simply the wrong type to be aesthetic.
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All of these concerns are summed up in the common classification of taste as a "subjective" sense, meaning that it directs attention largely inward to the state of our own bodies, to our mouth and tongue and what is going on as food slides into our interiors. Therefore, taste experiences furnish the paradigm of private experiences that are relative to individuals. But of course there is another side to the philosophical story, for taste also provides the guiding metaphor used to describe the ability to discern beauty in nature and art.
Given the poor reputation of the gustatory sense, one might be surprised to see it pressed into such delicate service. But several features of the sense of taste dispose it for this usage. A backdrop to the acceptance of the metaphor of taste is a deeply-rooted controversy that heated up in the eighteenth-century: philosophers were divided between those who believed that reason remains the chief mental faculty to apprehend value, and those who reinterpreted the operation of the mind and attributed evaluative function to a capacity they variously termed "sensibility," "sentiment," or "inner sense.
Therefore, to identify a sense as the metaphor for the mechanism of value apprehension suited the waning allegiance to reason as the guiding evaluative faculty. Taste requires intimate, first-hand acquaintance with its objects. One cannot judge the taste of food from second-hand reports, and the same may be said of an object of beauty.
Furthermore, taste is a sense that nearly always has a value valence—that is, one either likes or dislikes what is tasted.
This feature continues to be part of scientific studies of taste, which is the one sense about which researchers consistently inquire about pleasure reactions. Properly cultivated, the sense of taste can detect fine distinctions among different kinds of food and drink, just as the good critic is able to discern subtle qualities in works of art.
Hume posits a "great resemblance between mental and bodily taste" in his famous retelling of a story of a wine-tasting contest from Don Quixote : According to this tale, two kinsmen of Sancho Panza possessed amazingly "delicate" taste. To test their pretensions, their fellow villagers had them assess the contents of a hogshead of wine. Very good, said one, except for a slight taste of metal; excellent, agreed the other, save for that faint whiff of leather.
One might expect that the widespread adoption of the taste metaphor to speak of beauty and art would repair the traditional dismissal of the literal, gustatory sense. However, many theorists were insistent—far more insistent than Hume—that "taste" is only a metaphor. From one point of view, philosophical stubbornness on this point might be regarded simply as unwonted conservatism, but there is far more to the story than disciplinary prejudice.
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Because of the radical identity thesis of beauty and pleasure, philosophers carefully stipulated the parameters of aesthetic pleasure in order to illuminate how this venerable value could preserve its importance yet lose its objectivity. That is, the subjectivity of taste suited the sense as a metaphor for aesthetic judgments—which are also subjective, as any pleasure is by definition; but the idea that there is "no argument" about taste in the absence of standards is an unacceptable extension of the similarity of the two sorts of taste.
In the course of debates over the standards that could be ascertained for aesthetic subjectivity, philosophers revisited and considerably revised traditional analyses of the nature of pleasure itself—long regarded as the signal that a desire or interest has been satisfied. Hence the birth of the celebrated criterion of "disinterestedness" for aesthetic enjoyment. However urgent that agenda, even a defender of the philosophical mainstream has to admit that the nature of gustatory taste has been distorted in the contrast that it supposedly provides to aesthetic taste.
How does the sense of taste really operate? Is its alleged "subjectivity" any more private or indisputable than the experiences furnished by other senses? And what kind of enjoyment does it—or can it—furnish to the attentive percipient? Just how much Brillat-Savarin was aware of either the unsavory reputation of taste in the history of philosophy or the uses of "taste" in the growing traditions of aesthetics I do not know.
It seems likely he was familiar with some of the current popular treatments of taste, such as those written by his favorite, Voltaire. Indeed, his book might have been titled "The Physiology of Pleasure," so central is that concept in his study. Pleasure, he contends, serves as a gauge indicating that the entire human machine is functioning according to plan.
Taste in the eighteenth century - a bibliography
In his view, the association of taste and sexual pleasures indicates how the senses work towards the preservation of the individual and the continuation of the species, for he classes sexual desire as a sixth sense He enthuses about this association frequently, as with his encomium to the aphrodisiac truffle. Against over-indulgence, he sensibly recommends his own brand of Aristotelian moderation though he may have preached this more than practiced it MacDonogh.
The motive for moderation is probably more hedonistic than moral, because gorging reduces taste pleasure; but the directive economically serves both ends. Brillat distinguishes three referents for the term "taste": the sense organ, the sensation aroused, and the properties of sapid, or tastable, substances Although smell and taste have been designated "chemical" senses for some centuries, the precise way that chemical action produces different tastes is only now being discovered.
Therefore it would not be reasonable to expect any early insights about chemical interactions from Brillat, who does not go much beyond the ancient observation that substances need to be soluble in order to be tasted. However, some of his other comments are remarkably prescient of contemporary taste research. Consider for instance his study of the tongue.
The tongue is the chief organ of taste, and many have surmised that the little bumps on its surface are somehow responsible for sensations. Current physiology distinguishes four types of papillae on the tongue, three of which contain taste buds in humans. Those that contain the most taste buds are the fungiform papillae, so called because when magnified they look like little mushrooms.
Brillat who uses "buds" and "papillae" interchangeably observes:. In this surmise Brillat is correct. Taste researcher Linda Bartoshuk distinguishes what she calls "supertasters" from "nontasters," referring to people who are especially sensitive to certain bitter chemicals as well as to a large range of taste qualities. Supertasters are endowed with far more fungiform papillae than nontasters, she reports, as one can discover by simple experiment: Paint your tongue with blue food coloring, shine a flashlight on it, and look in a mirror.
Lots of blue spots indicate the less sensitive nontaster Bartoshuk. Discovery of a physical reason why taste sensations can differ provides causal grounding for one aspect of the alleged relativity of taste preferences. Physical reasons for this sort of variation are hardly unique to taste, however, as Brillat notes with his comparison to variant hearing capacities His analysis of the organ of taste furnishes the beginnings of an implicit rejoinder to one of the most complicated claims about the subjectivity of taste: that it is an inward-directed sense the experience of which is essentially private, and therefore about which there is no disputing.
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Korsemeyer, "Tastes and Pleasures" | Romantic Circles
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Share Give access Share full text access. Share full text access. Please review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article. Zeljko Loparic admits that:. There is no clarity, for example, concerning the difference between the negation of a proposition or a predicate. The point of view of relation mixes the relation between concepts, expressed by "categorical" judgments, with relations between judgments.
The point of view of modality is rather methodological-epistemological than semantic. This brings us to the vexed question of the relation between logic and language, but also between epistemology and psychology. After drawing a metaphorical comparison between reading letters and linking representations in a linear temporal form, Makkreel , p. The reading metaphor can be used to extend this formal analysis of consciousness by adding a conventional linguistic dimension to epistemology.
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